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CURRENT AVIATION DECISIONS IN
CONFLICT OF LAWS
H. NORMAN KINZY*
D URING the last several years, many notable decisions have
been handed down which involve both aviation litigation and
"conflict of laws" or "choice of law" problems. The term "conflict of
laws" has been defined as the conflict existing between litigants as to
which sovereignty's laws will be invoked to determine the issues in
controversy. It concerns the rights of persons within the territory
and dominion of one sovereignty by reason of acts, public or pri-
vate, done within the territory of another sovereignty, and is based
on the broad general principle that one sovereignty or forum will
respect and give effect to the laws of another so far as can be done
consistently with its own interests.' Many in-roads have recently
been made into this general statement of the basis of conflict of laws
rules.
This paper does not extend to a discussion of (1) those acts
which may subject a manufacturer to jurisdiction in a certain state,
except insofar as those acts may be a basis for the exercise and ap-
plication of the law of the forum, or the "lex fori," or (2) to any
situation other than those normally involving tortious liability,
whether it be in the form of negligence, strict liability, or breach
of warranty, including closely related matters. In other words, this
paper does not extend to questions of choice of law involving con-
tracts, or other matters, except as they may arise by virtue of the
contractual aspects of actions for breach of warranty. Similarly,
when no aviation cases have been decided, but a general principle
* B.B.A., University of Texas Tech, 1963; LL.B., University of Texas, 1966;
Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas, Associate in the firm of Strasburger, Price,
Kelton, Martin & Unis, and active member of the Texas, Dallas, and American
Bar Associations.
' 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws S 1(2) (1967); 12 TEx. JuR.2d Conflict of
Laws § 1 (1960).
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is necessary for better understanding, non-aviation cases or general
reference materials including A.L.R. Annotations have been used
as a beginning point for further research.
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS
Historically, a long established rule in resolving conflicts of law
has been that the law of the place of the wrong, the lex loci delicti,
governs the substantive rights of the parties to a tort action. This
rule has in years past been universally recognized, and is recognized
today by a large number of jurisdictions.2 In recent years, especially
since 1963, an almost equal number of jurisdictions have departed
from the lex loci delicti rule and have adopted one or more variants
of a doctrine known as the "most significant contacts or relation-
ship" doctrine. This doctrine requires that the forum court analyze
all of the facts and factors involved to determine what law is most
appropriate for application, under the particular analytical theory
or process employed, to govern the party's rights and liabilities with
respect to any issue in tort.3
2Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 603,613 (1970). A recent review indicates that the
following jurisdictions remain adherents of the doctrine of lex loci delicti as their
choice of law rule in multi-state tort situations: Alabama-Spencer v. Malone
Freight Lines, 298 So. 2d 20 (Ala. 1974); Arkansas-McGinty v. Ballentine
Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966); Connecticut-Landers v.
Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Delaware-Folk v. York-Ship-
ley, Inc., 239 A.2d 236 (Del. 1968); Florida-Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967); Georgia-Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp.,
418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969); Guam-Pederson v. United States, 191 F. Supp.
95 (D. Guam 1961); Illinois-Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544
(1966); Kansas-McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1019 (1965);
Maryland-Cook v. Pryor, 251 Md. 41, 246 A.2d 271 (Md. Ct. App. 1968);
Massachusetts-Doody v. John Sexton & Co., 411 F.2d 1119 (1st Cir. 1969);
Michigan-McVickers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 194 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.
Mich. 1961); Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969);
Nebraska-Epperson v. Christensen, 324 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Neb. 1971); Nevada
-Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1065 (D. Nev.
1973); New Mexico--Smith v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 382 F.2d 190 (10th Cir.
1967); North Carolina-Cobb v. Clark, 265 N.C. 194, 143 S.E.2d 103 (1965);
Puerto Rico-DeVane v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 18 (D.P.R. 1966); South
Carolina-Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964); South Dakota
-Heidemann v. Rohl, 194 N.W.2d 164 (S.D. 1972); Tennessee-Winters v.
Maxey, 481 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. 1972); Texas-Marmon v. Mustang Aviation,
430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968); Utah-W. W. Clyde & Co. v. Dyess, 126 F.2d
719 (10th Cir. 1942); Virginia-McDonough v. Kellogg, 295 F. Supp. 594
(D. Va. 1969); Washington-Huddleston v. Angeles Cooperative Creamery, 315
F. Supp. 307 (D. Wash. 1970); West Virginia-Chase v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
195 S.E.2d 810 (W.Va. 1973).
3 Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 603, 622 (1970); Alaska-Armstrong v. Armstrong,
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It will be noted from review of these cases that while there has
been a definite trend away from lex loci delicti in the past twelve
years, there have been numerous instances in which courts recently
have reviewed the doctrine of lex delicti and have refused to aband-
on it for the "most significant relationship" doctrine.'
Furthermore, it frequently becomes necessary to determine where
the tort was committed or the "place" of the tort. The general rule
is that the "place" of the tort, within the contemplation of the lex
loci delicti rule, is the place where the injury or death was inflicted
and not the place where the allegedly wrongful act or omission
took place This rule has been applied in the majority of claims for
recovery for tortious acts, whether the right to recover was alleged
in terms of negligence,' or on grounds of strict liability or defective
441 P.2d 699 (Alas. 1968); Arizona--Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447
P.2d 254 (1968); California-Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727,
63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Colorado-First Nat'l Bank in Fort Collins v. Rostek,
514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973); D.C.-Meyers v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577 (D.C. App.
1967); Idaho-Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 92 Idaho 718, 449 P.2d 378
(1968); Illinois-Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post No. 2665, 97 I11. App. 2d
139, 239 N.E.2d 856 (1968); Indiana-Witherspoon v. Salm, 237 N.E.2d 116
(Ind. App. 1968); Iowa-Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968);
Kentucky-Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Louisiana-Romero
v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 277 So.2d 649 (La. 1973); Maine-
Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970); Minnesota-Schneider v. Nichols,
280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Kopp v. Rechlzigel, 273 Minn. 441,
141 N.W.2d 526 (1966); Mississippi-Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509 (Miss.
1968); Missouri-Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); North Dakota
-Issendorf v. Olsen, 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972); New Hampshire-Clark
v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); New Jersey-Mellk v. Sarahson,
49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); New York-Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d
473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Ohio-Fox v. Morrison Motor
Freight, Inc., 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405 (1971); Oklahoma-Williams
v. Texas Kenworth Co., 307 F. Supp. 748 (W.D. Okla. 1969); Oregon-Casey
v. Manson Construction and Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1966);
Pennsylvania-Kuchinic v. McCory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966); Rhode
Island-Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917 (1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 957 (1968); Wisconsin-Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d
408 (1965). It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to go into the nu-
merous variants that have been employed by these jurisdictions in determining
which contacts or interests are most significant and controlling. For an analysis
of this nature see Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 603, 622, et seq. (1970).
4Winters v. Maxey, 481 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. 1972); Heidemann v. Rohl, 194
N.W.2d 1964 (S.D. 1972); Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d
137 (1969).
5 Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1266, 1273 (1961); Page v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc.,
155 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Tex. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 259 F.2d 420 (5th
Cir. 1958); Pack v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 50 Del. 413, 132 A.2d 54 (1957);
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
1 Seguros Tepeyac, S.A. v. Bostrom, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965).
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design.' This same rationale is also applicable to situations involv-
ing airplane accidents Certain courts have avoided the need for the
use of this rule by characterization of the plaintiff's action as one for
breach of warranty, breach of implied warranty for fitness or simi-
lar warranties. In such a case the courts have utilized the contrac-
tual aspects of that action to declare that the law of the state of sale
or delivery of the allegedly defective article governs the extent and
scope of the plaintiff's action and recovery.'
In those jurisdictions which have abandoned lex loci delicti, a
determination of the "place" of the tort has lost some of its signifi-
cance since under the "significant relationships" doctrine, the forum
state will not necessarily apply the law of the "place" of the tort.
Determination of the "place" of the tort might be factually neces-
sary, however, so that the forum court would know from which
jurisdiction its ultimate selection of applicable laws might come.
With this background, the remainder of this article will examine
some of the current aviation decisions concerning conflict of laws.
I. NEGLIGENCE CASES
A. Lex Loci Delicti
In 1964, an airliner operated by Trans World Airlines crashed
in Rome, Italy, resulting in twelve cases for death and injury
against Boeing and Trans World Airlines. Applying Illinois con-
flict of laws principles as substantive law, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Manos v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc." held that Italian law should be applied to determine
liability, i.e., whether a tort had been committed. Italy was not,
however, concerned with the measurement of damages; therefore,
the court applied the law of the states of the passengers or their
estates mn evaluating damages. The court further interpreted the Illi-
nois conflict of laws rule as a "relaxation of the lex loci delicti rule"
and stated that the plaintiffs' fears about the rendition of many dif-
ferent decisions if the lex loci delicti rule was not applied were
'Pack v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 50 Del. 413, 132 A.2d 54 (1957).
8Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1266, 1277 (1961).
'See Section IV(C) infra.
"295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Ill. 1969); see also the related cases of Manos
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill. 1971); and Manos v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
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unfounded since mainly "false conflict" questions were presented be-
cause of the similarity of the laws of the various states. The court did
recognize, determine, and resolve, however, the true conflicts
questions regarding statutes of limitations and plaintiff's allegations
of breach of express or implied warranty.
In Heidemann v. Rohl," a case involving a claim for wrongful
death arising out of an aircraft crash occurring in Nebraska, the
South Dakota Supreme Court refused to adopt "a modem frag-
mented approach to the settlement of multi-state conflict of laws
problems because of the lack of discernable and suitable guide-
lines." South Dakota has a "borrowing" statute which incorporates
foreign statutes of limitation applicable to foreign causes of action.
Although the South Dakota Supreme Court interprets this "borrow-
ing" statute as allowing the enforcement in South Dakota courts
of causes of actions for wrongful death arising under foreign state
statutes, in a case of apparent first impression in South Dakota,
the court adopted lex loci delicti.
We prefer to retain the traditional 'place of wrong' rule with its
built-in virtues of certainty, simplicity, and ease of application. An
impressive number of other courts have recently assessed the merits
of the 'modern rule' and have refused to adopt any variant of it.
(citing cases)
It is interesting to note that the flight involved was a trip from
Colorado Springs, Colorado, to the decedent's home in Sioux Falls,
South Dakota, and Nebraska had absolutely nothing to do with
the parties to the lawsuit.
Similiarly, in Pratt v. Royder," a Texas Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's petition for
wrongful death and damages to the estate under the Texas Sur-
vival Act.' The controversy arose from the death of plaintiff's hus-
band in an aircraft accident occurring in Mexico. Plaintiff's deced-
ent was a resident of Maine, the defendant was a resident of Texas,
and the only other contact that Texas had with the crash was that
a portion of the flight originated from Dallas. The Texas Supreme
n 194 N.W.2d 164 (S.D. 1972).
"Id. at 167.
"517 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
'
4 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5525 (1958).
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Court decision in Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc.,' holding
that the Texas Wrongful Death Statute"0 has no extra-territorial ef-
fect, served as a partial basis for dismissal of the action. The rule
enunciated in Marmon required that the law of Mexico, rather than
of Maine or Texas, would determine both the defendants liability
and the measure of any damages.
B. "Most Significant Relationship" Doctrine
In 1973, the Colorado Supreme Court in First National Bank v.
Rostek," dealt with an aircraft accident that occurred in South
Dakota in which a husband and wife, both Colorado residents,
were killed in an aircraft registered in Colorado. The court re-
jected the trial court's use of lex loci delicti in applying the South
Dakota Aviation Guest Statute and adopted as the Colorado rule
the "most significant relationship" doctrine found in Section 145
of the Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws. The court adopted
this doctrine because of its belief that a more flexible approach was
necessary. The Colorado Supreme Court noted disagreement be-
tween various commentators as to which approach should be used
and indicated its general disregard for the "ad hoc" approach which
presents no guidelines at all. In considering the conflict of laws
issue in a guest-host situation, the Rostek court reviewed the recent
Neumeier v. Kuehner decision 8 and adopted the first two sections
of Judge Fuld's rules set forth in the Neumeier decision." Going
15430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968).16TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (1940).
17 514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973); cf. Murphy v. Colorado Aviation, Inc., 353
F. Supp. 1095 (D. Colo. 1973) decided before Rostek, supra.
18 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
18 The first two sections to Judge Fuld's rule state:
1. When the guest-passenger and host-driver are domiciled in the
same state, and the car is there registered, the law of that state
should control and determine the standard of care which the host
owes his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile
and that state does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he
should not be held liable by reason of the fact that liability would
be imposed upon him under the tort law of the state of the vic-
tim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest was injured in the state
of his own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver who
has come into that state should not-in the absence of special
circumstances-be permitted to interpose the law of his state as
a defense.
31 N.Y.2d at -, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
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further, the court adopted the Restatement's "most significant re-
lationship" doctrine for situations in multi-state tort controversies
involving questions other than the host-guest issue, and indicated
that it would in the future "lay down more specific choice of law
rules governing other areas, as we have done today in the area of
guest statutes."' 0
In Brickner v. Gooden," the Oklahoma Supreme Court was faced
with a suit involving personal injuries sustained by Oklahoma resi-
dents in an airplane crash which occurred near Mexico City, Mexi-
co, during a trip that began and was to end in Oklahoma. The
court addressed itself to the applicability of the lex loci delicti doc-
trine and determined that in multi-state tort actions litigated in
Oklahoma, the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to
a "particular issue" in tort will be determined by the local law of the
state which, with respect to that issue, has the "most significant re-
lationship" to the occurrence and the parties. This language is taken
almost verbatum from the Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws,
Section 145 (1969).
O'Keefe v. Boeing Company,' a very complex negligence and
products liability case, arose out of the crash of an Air Force B-52
bomber manufactured by Boeing. Though at least nine individuals
were on board, of whom seven were killed, the opinion is not
clear as to which parties were actually plaintiffs, thus limiting the
opinion's usefulness. The aircraft was designed, manufactured, sold,
and delivered by the defendant to the Air Force in the state of
Washington and thereafter stationed in Massachusetts. It crashed
in Maine and the crew members were from different parts of the
United States. Decedent O'Keefe was the only citizen of New York
where suit was brought. Citing New York law, the federal district
court held that a New York forum, essentially neutral in a given
death action, could ignore the lex loci delicti and apply the "most
significant relationship" doctrine espoused in Babcock v. Jackson."
The O'Keefe court, therefore, found that the law of the place of de-
sign, manufacture, sale, and delivery of the aircraft in question
(the state of Washington) governed the plaintiffs' claims for both
11First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314, 320 (Colo. 1973).
21 525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974).
22335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
- 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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negligence and breach of warranty, as opposed to Maine, the place
of the accident, or any other jurisdiction. The court concluded that
insofar as this case against Boeing was concerned, the state of
Washington was the state with the greatest concern with the spe-
cific issues of manufacturer's liability.
C. Comment
Though not an aviation case, the recent decision of Neumeier v.
Kuehner' is interesting to note in connection with those states that
have adopted the "most significant relationship" doctrine, since this
doctrine comes from the state that originated the move away from
the doctrine of lex loci delicti. It is also appropriate to comment
thereon since the Colorado Supreme Court adopted the first two
parts of the Neumeier rule in First National Bank v. Rostek.' In
Neumeier, the New York Court of Appeals recognized that the deci-
sion in Babcock v. Jackson" resulted in quite inconsistent decisions
by the New York courts. The Neumeier v. Kuehner decision, com-
ing just nine years after Babcock v. Jackson, formulated more pre-
cise rules" to reinject the element of consistency removed by the
Babcock v. Jackson decision. The Rhode Island Supreme Court in
Labree v. Major,"' interpreted Neumeier v. Kuehner, as signalling
a retreat by New York courts from their earlier adoption of the
"most significant relationship" doctrine and a reacceptance of the
lex loci delicti rule. In effect, the Neumeier v. Kuehner rule, as
adopted in Rostek, is one of (1) lex loci "domicile" and (2) lex
loci delicti. The Colorado Supreme Court has not gone so far as
to adopt the third portion of the Neumeier rule, which, of course,
is by its own terms "normally" lex loci delicti, but has elected to cast
the Colorado courts adrift into the same sea of "significant rela-
tionships" from which New York has recently and substantially re-
turned."
2431 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 334 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). As previously
noted, this decision concerns the application of conflict of laws principles to host-
guest situations.
" 514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973).
26 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1971).
27 See text accompanying note 19, supra.
28 306 A.2d 808, 817 (R.I. 1973).
"'See Rogers v. U-Haul Co., 342 N.Y.S.2d 158 (App. Div. N.Y. 1973), an
automobile case in which the defendant resided in New York, while plaintiff's
decedent, a passenger, lived in Alabama. The defendant, U-Haul Company, was
CONFLICT OF LAWS
II. STRICT LIABILITY
Generafly speaking, the doctrine of strict liability is an action
sounding in tort rather than contract." The applicable choice of
law rules will therefore either be lex loci delicti or the "most signi-
ficant relationship" doctrine, depending on the forum state." This
is not true with regard to those cases involving claims for breach
of implied warranties in which emphasis, for choice of law purposes,
is placed upon the contractual aspects of the action, thus selecting
the place of sale or delivery of the items as the source of applicable
law. This dichotomy is remarkable in light of the generally recog-
nized view that strict liability in tort and liability under implied
warranty without the requirement of privity are merely different
ways of describing the very same cause of action."
Compare, for instance, the unusual result reached in the second
Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. decision' and the third Manos
decision, ' both of which dealt with the crash of a TWA airliner in
Rome, Italy. In the second Manos case, the district court, noting
that Illinois conflict of laws principles require the application of the
law of the place of the tort to determine whether or not a tort was
committed, nevertheless held that the plaintiffs' allegations of ex-
press or implied warranty must, under other applicable Illinois con-
flict of laws principles, be defined and limited by the law of the state
where the article was sold, i.e., Washington.' In the third Manos
also doing business in New York, and the motor vehicle was leased in New
York for a one-way trip to Alabama. During that trip, an accident occurred in
Pennsylvania. The trial court followed Neumeier v. Kuehner, and held that sec-
tion 3 of Judge Fuld's Neumeier decision was applicable, and concluded that
the law of the place of the accident, Pennsylvania, would be applied, all of which
resulted in dismissal of the complaint against the defendant, U-Haul. It is in-
teresting to note that the court found no compelling reason to apply New York
policy and law, and further declined to apply the law of the plaintiff's residence,
Alabama, which the court noted to be the ". . . state most interested...," all
in adherence to Neumeier. The trial court obviously abandoned the "most sig-
nificant relationship" doctrine, stating that the question was only whether New
York or Pennsylvania law was applicable. Affirmance by the Appellate Division
indicates a correct resolution of the issue under Neumeier.
3
"Doss v. Apache Powder Co., 430 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1970).
" Smith v. General Motors Corp., 382 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
2 O'Keefe v. Boeing Company, 335 F. Supp. 1104, 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
1295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
'Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
1295 F. Supp. at 1176.
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case,' the court looked to the law of Washington to "define and
limit" the action for alleged breach of implied warranty, and found
that Washington did not have such a cause of action, but that the
law of Washington was strict liability, a tort concept, under Sec-
tion 402A of the Restatement of Torts (Second). The district court,
therefore, applied Washington law regarding a Washington tort
cause of action; if, however, the true tortious nature of the action
for breach of warranty had been recognized under Illinois choice of
law rules, rather than the contractual "place of sale" aspects of the
action, the litigation possibly would have been governed by the sub-
stantive tort law of Illinois, Italy, or another jurisdiction. The most
rational explanation for the court's characterization of this breach
of warranty action as contractual rather than tortious, and its result-
ant selection of the applicable Illinois choice of law rule, is found
in the rule that the law of the forum will always be applied to char-
acterize the nature of the cause of action for choice of law pur-
poses."
III. BREACH OF WARRANTY
A. Lex Loci Delicti:
A recent aviation case applying the choice of law rule of lex
loci delicti to allegations of breach of warranty is Uppgren v. Exec-
utive Aviation Services, Inc.8 Uppgren concerns a helicopter crash
in Minnesota which took the life of a Minnesota resident. The heli-
copter was sold and delivered in Maryland to the United States In-
terior Department. Despite the contentions of both parties that
either the law of Maryland or the law of the District of Columbia
should control the cause of action which was based on breach of
warranty, the district court noted the historical background in tort
law of the action for breach of warranty and found it to be so close-
ly related to tort that it should be subject to the lex loci delicti rule
of Maryland, the state in which the district court was sitting. The
court then held Minnesota law, the site of the crash, to be applicable
to plaintiff's breach of warranty claims, thereby making applicable
the Minnesota statutory wrongful death damage limitation.
11 324 F. Supp. 470 (D.C. Il1. 1971).
" Parrish v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 46 Mich. App. 85, 207 N.W.2d 422, 424
(1973).
11326 F. Supp. 709 (D. Md. 1971).
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It clearly would seem that actions for wrongful death or personal
injury based upon allegations of breach of implied warranty of fit-
ness or merchantability, or upon other similar breaches of war-
ranty, are more closely related to a tort than a contract," but the
reluctance of some courts to recognize this leads to such possibilities
as that almost faced by the Third Circuit in Paoletto v. Beech Air-
craft Corporation.' Paoletto was decided by a federal district court
sitting in Delaware under diversity jurisdiction in a wrongful death
cause of action arising out of an airplane crash in Alaska. The
plaintiff alleged negligence and breach of warranty. The court
applied Delaware choice of law rules and found that the character-
ization of the action as breach of warranty created a problem. Since
breach of warranty was alleged, the Delaware choice of law rules
would select as controlling the law of the state of the sale, Kansas
in this case; whereas, had the action been characterized a multi-state
tort, then the Delaware choice of law would apply the law of Alaska
under the doctrine of lex loci delicti. In this particular case, the
Third Circuit found the law of Alaska in strict liability cases to be
the same as Kansas product liability law in breach of warranty
cases, thus presenting a "false conflict" which did not require the
resolution of the choice of law question. Nevertheless, the possibili-
ty of a divergent characterization of a breach of warranty cause of
action for wrongful death or personal injuries as either tortious or
contractual in nature, particularly in cases where allegations of
both negligence and breach of warranty are encountered, continue
to pose potential problems, which may in fact, constitute "real
conflicts." The more enlightened view would seem to be that taken
by the Third Circuit in Raritan Trucking Corporation v. Aero Com-
mander, Inc.," in which the court stated:
Although actions based on breach of implied warranty of fitness
and those based on strict liability in tort may be distinguished, in
New Jersey the two actions have tended to become merged. '
The merger of the two doctrines, if the end result is deemed to be
tortious in nature, would eliminate the possibility of the type of
3McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co. of Texas, 391 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968).
40464 F.2d 976 (3rd Cir. 1972).
-' 458 F.2d 1106 (3rd Cir. 1972); see also O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., supra note
20.
4'458 F.2d at 1113.
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conflict almost experienced by the court in Paoletto and the type
of conflict which will almost always be experienced by a court when
both negligence and breach of warranty are alleged by the plain-
tiff in the same suit and breach of warranty is deemed contractual
by the forum state for choice of law purposes.
B. "Most Significant Relationships" Doctrine
As previously noted, the federal district court in O'Keefe v. Boe-
ing Company " held, within the context of New York's "most sig-
nificant relationship" doctrine, that the law of the state of Washing-
ton, the place of design, manufacture, sale, and delivery of the B-52
bomber governed the plaintiffs' claims for recovery under allega-
tions of both negligence and breach of warranty.
C. Place of Sale or Delivery:
A not uncommon approach to choice of law when allegations of
breach of warranty are concerned is that set forth in Quandt v.
Beech: Aircraft Corporation" in which the Delaware federal district
court applied the Delaware conflict of laws rule to breach of war-
ranty actions and held that the substantive law of Kansas, the state
of manufacture and sale of the aircraft would govern. In the same
case, the court, applying the Delaware choice of law rule with re-
gard to torts, held that the allegations of negligence against Beech
Aircraft Company would be governed by the law of Italy, the
place where the accident occurred. Thus, Quandt represents a true
case of a Paoletto-type conflict, which arises from the mere charac-
terization of the nature of the claim. Reference should also be made
to Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.' in which a federal district
court in Illinois applied the Illinois choice of laws rule to plaintiffs'
allegations of breach of express and implied warranties, and upon
finding that the aircraft in question had been manufactured, sold,
and delivered by Boeing in Washington state, declared Washington
law to govern the definition and limits of the action.
In Holcomb v. Cessna Aircraft Company and Continental Mo-
tors," a suit to recover for engine defects in a Cessna aircraft, the
43335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
4317 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Del. 1970); see also Prashker v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 258 F.2d 602 (3rd Cir. 1958); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201
So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
4295 F. Supp. 1170 (D.C. Ill. 1969).
46439 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1971).
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Fifth Circuit apparently approved the Florida trial court's holding
that the liability of the defendant under allegations of breach of
expressed and implied warranties was to be governed by the law of
Kansas, the place of the sale. The aircraft, however, was delivered
to the purchaser in Louisiana. The court also stated that a manu-
facturer could not be held liable on the theory of implied warranty
in absence of proof of a defect in the article "on the date of deliv-
ery."" If the date of delivery is controlling, an unresolved question
arises whether the law of Louisiana, the place of delivery, should
control, as opposed to the law of Kansas, the state of the sale.
D. Uniform Commercial Code:
The advent of the Uniform Commercial Code and its effects in
situations involving allegations of breach of warranty has not yet
been fully felt. In the absence of relevant aircraft cases dealing
with the implied warranties found in Sections 2.314 and 2.315 of
the U.C.C., it is enough to note the choice of law provisions set
forth in Section 1.105 and the four-year statute of limitations set
forth in Section 2.725. Parrish v. B. F. Goodrich Company8
is indicative of the manner in which one court attempted to recon-
cile the U.C.C. provisions to its tort oriented breach of warranty ac-
tions and its general tort statute of limitations.
IV. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
While statutes of limitations in a choice of law context normally
are termed either (1) substantive, as in statutory wrongful death
causes of action (and hence lex loci delicti is applicable), or (2)
procedural, when the statute of limitation merely bars the remedy
and not the right (and hence the lex fori applies) ,' the whole "sub-
stantive-procedural" discourse may be rendered moot by the appli-
cation of the "most significant relationship" doctrine. This was done
in Sergeant v. Eagle Flight Ways, Inc."An Oregon circuit court there
allowed a statutory cause of action for wrongful death to be heard
in Oregon although it was barred by the statute of limitation under
4 7 Id. at 1156.
1146 Mich. App. 85, 207 N.W.2d 422 (1973).
4 Ramsay v. Boeing Co., 432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970); Francis v. Herrin
Transportation Co., 432 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 1968).
50 12 CCH Av. CAS. 18,128 (Ore. Cir. Ct. 1973).
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the law of British Columbia, the place of the accident since the
court found that Oregon was the state with the most significant
contacts.
In Ramsay v. Boeing Company,1 the lower court had applied
the Mississippi "center of gravity" choice of law doctrine, adopted
from the Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws. The trial court
found that Belgium had the most contacts with the accident and
the application of Belgian law, where the accident occurred, as well
as the statute of limitations of that jurisdiction barred the plaintiff's
claims. None of the plaintiffs were residents of Mississippi, the
forum state. Plaintiffs had selected Mississippi simply to take ad-
vantage of the six-year statute of limitations, but the Fifth Circuit
approved a finding that the five-year Belgium statute of limitations
was substantive and would be applied under Mississippi choice of
law rules to bar the plaintiffs' actions.
When the limitation is part of a foreign statutory right of action,
the expiration of which extinguishes the right to sue, and the forum
state adheres to the lex loci delicti rule, then that foreign statute of
limitations will generally be held applicable to suits based upon
that statutory case of action and brought in the forum state." Fre-
quently, however, this general scheme is complicated by the pres-
ence of a "borrowing" statute or the "Uniform Statute of Limita-
tions on Foreign Claims Act."' These "borrowing" statutes general-
ly provide that:
The period of limitation applicable to a claim accruing outside of
this state shall be either that prescribed by the law of the place
where the claim accrued or by the law of this state, whichever bars
the claim (emphasis added).'
Thus, when the statutes of limitations outside the forum state are
shorter than those of the forum state, a choice of law question is
presented which requires a determination of the place where the
claim "accrued." This question may provide different answers de-
pending upon whether the claim is characterized as a tort in the
nature of strict liability or negligence, or a breach of warranty with
51432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970).
52 Pack v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 50 Del. 413, 132 A.2d 54 (1957).
-'See, e.g., MICH. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 600.5861; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 202.
54MICH. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 600.5861(2).
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contractual aspects. The greatest problems will occur with breach
of warranty actions which may be characterized in either manner
by different courts.
In Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,' for instance, the fed-
eral district court applied the Illinois "borrowing statute" which
had been interpreted by Illinois' courts to require a determination
and application of the law of the "place where the last act occurred
to create liability" to determine whether the statute of limitations of
that "place" would bar plaintiffs' action. The court in Manos found
that the lack of proof of the statute of limitations of Italy (the air
crash having occurred in Rome), was sufficient to prevent the grant-
ing of a summary judgment in favor of defendant based upon the
defense of limitations. Such "borrowing statutes"'" are really sta-
tutory embodiments of the rule of lex loci delicti in connection with
statutes of limitation which will be applied even though the forum
state has adopted the "most significant relationships" doctrine of
choice of law.
The same choice of law inquiry is found in O'Keefe v. Boeing
Company." The New York "borrowing statute"" is slightly differ-
ent from that of Michigan since it provides that New York resi-
dents will be affected only by the New York statute of limitations.
In O'Keefe the effect of the statute's application was a determina-
tion by the district court that plaintiffs' cause of action "accrued"
for limitation purposes in Washington state. The Washington sta-
tute of limitations period for the negligence alleged was three years,
which began to run from the time of the crash, thus allowing the
maintenance of the negligence cause of actions. The New York
"borrowing statute" did not, however, prevent application of the
six-year New York statute of limitation for actions based upon
breach of implied warranty of fitness. Since the New York statute
"295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Il. 1969).
"The "borrowing statute in Manos stated:
When a cause of action has arisen in a state or territory out of this
state, or in a foreign country, and, by the laws thereof, an action
thereon cannot be maintained by reason of the lapse of time, an
action thereon shall not be maintained in this state.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82 § 21 (1967). See 295 F. Supp. at 1175.
" 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see also Braniff Airways, Inc. v.
Curtis-Wright Corp., 424 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1969); George v. Douglas Aircraft
Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1964).
" CIVIL PRAc. L. & RULES § 202 (McKinney 1954).
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ran from the date of sale which was more than six years before the
commencement of the action, the statute barred only O'Keefe's
cause of action as the only New York resident.
V. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
Under the law as it prevails today, it is well settled that the right
to contribution or indemnity between joint tortfeasors is governed
by the law of the place where the tort has been committed, or lex
loci delicti. Nevertheless, a determination of which jurisdiction's
law of contribution and indemnity should be applied has also been
reached through the application of the "most significant relation-
ship" doctrine which could result in the application of a law from
a jurisdiction other than the place of the injury or place of the
tort." Conversely, in some states the application of the doctrine of
contribution, and, by probable implication the doctrine of indem-
nity, is held to be procedural, remedial law, therefore making the




Nevertheless, and despite this well-established body of state law,
the Seventh Circuit, in Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.," reversed
the trial court in part, and held that in a mid-air collision case
under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Liti-
gation, it was unnecessary to determine the availability of contribu-
tion or indemnity under state choice of law rules. The Seventh Cir-
cuit reached this conclusion by declaring that a federal law of con-
tribution and indemnity governed "mid-air collisions" such as that
involved in this diversity case. The court based its decision on
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, the federal
interest in uniform air law regulation, Section 1108 of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, the fact that a mid-air collision was involved,
the presence of the United States as a party under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, and the fact that the litigation was under the control of
the Multi-District Litigation Panel. The Seventh Circuit concluded
that there was no reason why federal law should not be applied to
determine the rights and liabilities of the parties involved in "avia-
"Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1096, 1099 (1964).
60 Kantlehener v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 122 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
" Perez v. Short Line Inc., 231 A.2d 642 (Del. 1967).
62 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974).
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tion collisions" insofar as contribution or indemnity was concerned,
and declared that the federal rule for contribution or indemnity in
such cases should be based on "comparative negligence" among
the responsible defendants. The court also discussed a situation in
which settlement had occurred, holding that the burden of proof
upon the party claiming contribution would also be to establish that
the amount paid in settlement was a reasonable settlement under
the circumstances before contribution or indemnity would be al-
lowed for the full extent of the voluntary settlement payment. An
application for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court is now pending," and it would appear that the Seventh Circuit
has obviously ignored the mandate of Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins," unless the matter of contribution and indemnity is truly
procedural and goes only to the remedy, rather than substantive
rights. In this event, and under the analysis spoken of above," such a
rule may be sustainable on the basis that it is actually a rule of feder-
al procedural law and not an invasion into the domain of state sub-
stantive law. The opinion was not grounded on this premise, how-
ever, and clearly, the decision is one which is contrary to other
multi-district panel litigation cases that have been previously de-
cided. One example is In re Air Crash Disaster Near Dayton, Ohio
on March 9, 1967" in which the Ohio District Court applied Ohio
law regarding rights to contribution or indemnification among joint
tortfeasors.
VI. RELEASES
It has been generally held that the law of the place of the wrong,
lex loci delicti, governs the question whether the release of one
tortfeasor operates to release all joint tortfeasors. ' This rule was
recently reaffirmed in Heidemann v. Rohl" in which the Supreme
Court of South Dakota, in determining the effect of a release of
"Since Mr. Kinzy submitted this article, the Supreme Court has denied cer-
tiorari. The author's comments have been left intact as representing a criticism
of that decision.
"304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5 See text accompanying note 61, supra; see also, 2 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TiCE 5 1.04[4], at 227 (2d ed. 1967).
0350 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
"Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1034, 1035 (1960).
68194 N.W.2d 164 (S.D. 1972).
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liability for damages arising from an air crash which occurred in
Nebraska, held that the law of Nebraska must be applied since
"the effect of a release is governed by the substantive law of the
place where the alleged tort occurred, 9 even though the release it-
self was executed in South Dakota in favor of a South Dakota resi-
dent defendant.
In other jurisdictions it has been held that the law governing
the effect of a release given by an injured party to one tortfeasor
may be determined either under the analysis of the "most signi-
ficant relationship" doctrine"0 or the lex fori.'
VII. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The effect of a state court judgment under doctrines of res judi-
cata or collateral estoppel may also involve choice of law consid-
erations, i.e., what law prescribes the effect to be given to a prior
judgment under one or both of the doctrines for those claiming the
benefit or protection of the former judgment? In Lowenstein v.
Executive Air Fleet Corporation,"2 it was held that since "the nature
and extent of the estoppel effect of a judgment depended on the
law of the state in which the judgment was rendered" New York
law should govern the effect of a previously rendered New York
state court judgment.
Normally federal district courts must apply the substantive law of
the state in which it sits, or in the case of a court which hears a case
from another district referred to it by the Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litigation, the law of the transferor court. Consider, how-
ever, the case of In re Air Crash Disaster Near Dayton, Ohio on
March 9, 1967," in which the court decided that the predominant
federal interest in the effective and efficient administration of the
federal judicial system required that federal law rather than state
law should determine the effect of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
"I Id. at 170.
70See Root v. Kaufman, 265 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1965), where in obedience
to Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963), the New York City Civil Court held that the effect of a release executed
in New Jersey concerning liability arising out of a New York accident would be
construed by the law of New Jersey, the state with the "preponderance of con-
tacts between the parties."
71 Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1034 (1974 Later Case Service).
72 11 CCH Av. CAs. 17,895 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
"1 350 F. Supp. 757 (D. Ohio 1972).
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The specific issue concerned whether a previously rendered federal
court judgment in diversity actions should control subsequent federal
suits involving the same issue. The court noted that it had earlier
assumed, without benefit of briefs, that it should apply the choice
of law rules of the transferor state of Michigan to the issue of the
effect of a prior federal court judgment, and a Michigan choice of
law rule would direct the application of the law of Ohio where the
tort occurred to determine the estoppel effect of the prior judgment.
The court reversed itself, however, and in doing so avoided the man-
date of Erie Railrad Company v. Tompkins"" by characterizing the
res judicata effect of a former federal court judgment as a proced-
ural, as opposed to a substantive, matter which did not go to the
"essence of a state-created cause of action." The district court found
"entirely different considerations" to be involved in this case so
"related to an overriding federal interest in the effective administra-
tion of justice in the federal court system," that federal law must
govern the preclusive effect, or res judicata issues, raised in that
litigation. The court then utilized the applicable collateral estoppel
rules to hold that in the context of mid-air collision multi-district
litigation it was not a violation of due process to bar a plaintiff from
relitigating the issue of a defendant's liability for the mid-air disas-
ter if the defendant's liability had been previously fully litigated in
a prior action, even though the instant plaintiff had not been a party
to that previous action.
In Humphreys v. Tann,"h the aggrieved plaintiff appealed this
ruling to the Sixth Circuit which reversed the trial court's opinion.
The Sixth Circuit found that due process was violated by the appli-
cation of collateral estoppel against one who was never a party to
the prior action. In reaching this ultimate decision, the Sixth Cir-
cuit, while noting that the trial court had clearly applied federal
law to determine the applicability of collateral estoppel, did not
reverse the trial court on the grounds that there was an improper
resolution of the applicable law. Instead, the Sixth Circuit evaded
the question by stating that "unless there exists a federal rule of
collateral estoppel which is different from that of Ohio, however,
it is not necessary to decide which law controls.""4 The court then
74304 U.S. 64 (1938).
- 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973).
7 Id. at 669.
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found inferentially that there was no difference which required this
decision. Accordingly, it is entirely possible that a federal law of
collateral estoppel will be applied by federal courts in the future,
especially in multi-district mid-air collision disasters.
VII. RES IPSA LOQUITUR
In O'Keefe v. Boeing Company," the court held that the applica-
bility and availability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would be
governed by New York law, the lex fori, since res ipsa loquitur is
a "procedural rule of evidence" and a matter of procedure is to be
controlled by the law of the forum even though the accident involved
occurred out of the forum state.
CONCLUSION
It appears that a practical and effective way to attack a question
of conflict of laws is to proceed by the following steps:
1. Determine the state of the forum court;
2. Determine the legal theories and issues alleged by the plain-
tiffs, i.e., negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, res ipsa
loquitur, or availability of limitations, etc.;
3. Determine the choice of law rule or doctrine, whether statute
or case law, of the forum state applicable to the plaintiff's allega-
tions of legal theories of action, or defensive issues;
4. If necessary, determine the forum state's characterization of
the nature of plaintiff's causes of action or other issues, and,
5. Determine and simplify the basic facts of the case to see
which jurisdiction's law will control under the applicable choice of
law rule and characterizations determined above, i.e., determine the
plaintiff's residence, the defendant's residence, the place of design,
manufacture, sale, and delivery of the aircraft in question, the place
of the accident, and any other outstanding interests or contacts that
one jurisdiction may have in the matter.
Upon conclusion of this analytical approach, it should be possible
to determine the jurisdiction whose law will control the resolution
of the material issues in litigation by fitting the simplified fact situa-
tion to the applicable choice of law rules.
7 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also Citrola v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 264 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1959). In O'Keefe the plaintiff also offered evidence
of specific acts of negligence.
Notes

